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Sabotage in the Financial System: Lessons from Veblen 
 Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan  
 
In the wide-ranging discussion of the causes of the global financial crisis, and the role of 
banking in today’s economy, questions of business tactics or financiers’ motives are rarely 
addressed. Indeed, while ‘incentives’, ‘vested interests,’ power and increasingly, social 
utility, are often factored in into analyses of financial regulation, the motives and tactics of 
financial institutions are rarely discussed in a systemic way in academic and policy debate. 
And yet we believe that these two elements are key to understanding the financial system not 
as a mere sector of the wider economy, but as a business enterprise, driven by its own logic 
and shaped by a variety of business tactics of its key agents.  In our vision of finance as 
business, we draw on the concept of industrial sabotage as a business tactic, originally 
developed by Thorsten Veblen, to inquire into the roots of the contemporary architecture of 
the financial sector. Our key premise is that the key motive driving the process that has been 
described as ‘financialization’ or financial innovation is the sabotage instinct of finance 
operating as businesses.  Whereas Veblen originally understood  sabotage as ‘conscientious 
withdrawal of efficiency’, today, we argue, the workings of the banking and financial sector 
augment the very notion of efficiency by relying on concepts, techniques and institutions of 
financial innovation, crucially, shrouded in complexity.  In this paper we explore conceptual 
and institutional dimensions of this phenomenon. 
 
Introduction  
 
“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief”- so  confessed 
Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
at the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearings on the financial 
crisis in 2008 (Greenspan 2008, 2). His testimony was greeted with a collective shudder 
that for a time, altogether too brief a time, placed the entire edifice of economic thought into 
question. Greenspan acknowledged that one of the key tenets of standard economics, the idea 
that ‘markets’ are best placed to judge what is good for them, might be wrong. Financial 
institutions and their managers proved either unable or unwilling to differentiate between 
AAA financial securities and worthless, and even toxic, assets. It turned out that many CEOs 
of large banking houses did not understand the nature of many of the products their 
institutions were selling. Senior executives could hardly fathom why they were making such 
lucrative profits, but felt, nonetheless, that the gigantic bonuses they merrily swallowed were 
entirely justified.  Inquiries like the one conducted by the Congressional committee in 2008 
showed that senior management of many leading banking groups often had vague ideas what 
kind of entities their organizations maintained. Like the proverbial ex P.F.C Wintergreen in 
Catch-22, the only people who seemed to know or understand what these financial 
innovations were, were to be found among the most junior and least experienced staff of the 
banks. Sharp and skilled, they were traders of fixed income securities working for 
commissions, or financial engineers devising complex mathematical schemes of value. Few, 
if any of them, had any overview of the systemic impact of their activities and products.  
More often than not, they simply were not interested in such questions.  Beneath the layer of 
precision and sophistication, there was chaos in the financial system. 
 In the years that followed, academics and policymakers have been trying to make 
sense of this chaos. Many of them draw their inspiration from the work of Hyman Minsky, 
largely forgotten before 2007, but resuscitated by the 2007-09 crisis.  Working in isolation 
during his career, Minsky was influenced by two traditions of thought that were skeptical of 
the paradigm of self-regulation and efficient finance. One familiar tradition leads back to 
Keynes and his focus on speculation in the financial system. The other current  is less well- 
known, although it goes back even farther in the history of economic thought, to a group of 
economists led by Thorstein Veblen,  John R. Commons and Joseph Schumpeter who  are 
known today as scholars of Old Institutional Economics (OIE). Minsky – although he never 
truly acknowledged it in his own writing -- was highly influenced by the OIE tradition. In 
fact, he started his doctoral studies at Harvard under the supervision of Joseph Schumpeter. 
We turn to Veblen, Commons, Schumpeter, Berle and other OIE scholars, in large 
part because these scholars were writing at the time of the most dramatic economic crisis and 
reorganization of the 20th century capitalism.  Interestingly, the Great Depression brought 
students of Veblen to the very core of policy-making: Adolf A. Berle, Rexford G. Tugwell 
and others were members of the first Roosevelt’s administration’s ‘brain trust’ (Tilman 
1996). The crisis of 2007-09 has also brought a new wave of scholars to the fore, who like 
OIE, demonstrate strong preference for inductive, as opposed to the traditional deductive 
methodologies of economics.  Andy Haldane at the Bank of England, Adair Turner at the 
FSA, Zoltan Poszar at U.S. Treasury, Claudio Borio and William White at the BIS, 
Manmohan Singh at the IMF, acknowledge, in one way or another, their intellectual debt to 
the OIE group and to Hyman Minsky.1  
                                       
1 Incidentally, back in 1957 Minsky himself consulted the first Commission on Money and Credit set up to 
investigate the adequacy of monetary and financial regulation in the USA. 
These echoes, we believe, warrant further inquiry into the fundamental ideas of OIE 
scholars and their descendants today.  In what follows, we focus on one key element in 
Veblen’s thought that can serve, we argue, as the basis for an alternative ‘macro theory’ of 
finance but which had been ignored thus far. Largely, we reckon, because it is rather simple 
and obvious. It is his notion that modern economy, that is, the economy that he witnessed 
taking shape in the late 19th century U.S., and which has been internationalized since, was 
dominated by the personality of the businessman, the principal ‘habit of thought’ of whom in 
terms of their outlook on profit making enterprise was what Veblen described as the 
technique of sabotage. 
 Veblen analyzed primarily industrial enterprises and his concept of sabotage was 
centered on the activities of the manufacturing sector (known as industrial sabotage). We 
believe though, that the idea has traction also in the sphere of finance. Our key premise is that 
the motive driving the process of financialization and more specifically, financial innovation, 
is the sabotage by the financial industry of its role of a provider of public good.  
 
Veblen’s Theory of Business and Sabotage 
In contrast to deductive approach and abstraction principles of orthodox economics, Veblen’s 
approach to economics was observational and empirical. His primary data series were 
congressional committee reports of late 19th and early 20th century, centering on the predatory 
practices of American businesses. Veblen concluded that the central figure in modern 
capitalism was neither the rational consumer, nor the ‘capitalist’ but rather, the figure of the 
businessman. Businessmen were people, he argued, with no specialized expertise in 
production, manufacturing, services or management, but were experts in ‘the art of buying 
and selling’. Veblen’s theory amounted in essence, to a series of generalizations of the likely 
behavioral patterns of the businessman, as purveyors and traders in property rights, under 
diverse environmental conditions. In our analysis of finance we propose, following on 
Veblen, to start from a simple and straightforward premise: Banks, as well as the various 
departments and desks that they are made of, tend to think and behave like businesses, and 
they see their interest and function exclusively in money terms. 
 What does it mean that banks are businesses? Far from embracing competitive 
markets, Veblen believed that businesses were concerned by the state of equilibrium 
conditions described in standard economics, since open and ‘fair’ competition inevitably 
would end up in wafer-thin profits, if at all. Businessmen complained about ‘ruinous 
competition,’ and devised an impressive array of techniques, documented by various 
congressional reports, that were intended to ensure that the free market of standard economics 
does not apply to their businesses. Best known of these devices were monopolies and cartels, 
but according to Veblen, these were only the tip of a very large iceberg.  
Veblen used a generic term to describe the businessman’s techniques for profit 
generation as ‘sabotage’. Sabotage was, in his words, ‘the deliberate, although entirely legal, 
practice of peaceful restriction, delay, withdrawal, or obstruction used to secure some special 
advantage or preference’ (Veblen, 2001 [1921], 4)  At the time of his writing, the term 
sabotage was associated with the fledgling trade unions as they sought to increase their power 
within the production process. Veblen appropriated the concept, and used it as a generic term 
to describe the behavior of the ‘captains of industry’  as they manipulated the rules and norms 
of property to ensure what he saw as ‘withdrawal’ from market, or the right to ensure that 
supply of goods and services is restricted in order to raise prices. These sorts of restrictions 
and withdrawal became key tools in the armory of, for instance, the railway companies, who 
would deliberately limit the number of journeys and available space on their lines to ensure 
higher prices. Some companies even employed private armies to destroy the lines placed by 
their competitors, resorting literally to physical sabotage. John R. Commons would later 
generalize upon the practice showing that subtle changes that were introduced by the Courts 
in the U.S. property laws in late 19th century allowed are interpretation of property rights 
from a right to hold, to a new and powerful right: the right to withhold. These sorts of rights, 
known in legal parlance as intangible property, were rights to withdraw or withhold, for 
instance, certain knowledge or patent and use it for private, profit making purposes.  
Sabotage was even more deeply rooted in the world of business. Businessmen, Veblen 
argued, would deliberately seek to disorient their competitors by restructuring and re-
organizing the world around them in ways that would sabotage their clients, competitors and 
governments. Sabotage, he argued, ‘commonly works within the law, although it may often 
be within the letter rather than the spirit of the law. It is used to secure some special 
advantage or preference, usually of a businesslike sort. It commonly has to do with something 
in the nature of a vested right, which one or another of the parties in the case aims to secure 
or defend, or to defeat or diminish’ (Veblen 2001 [1921], 6).  
 Sabotage did not necessarily produce deleterious impact on society. On the contrary, 
Veblen believed that innovation of new products, re-organizations and efficiencies in 
production, manufacturing and delivery, or managerial innovations, were driven primarily by 
the sabotaging instinct. Businessmen were not interested in producing better products per se; 
they adopted innovation in products and logistics as way of sabotaging their competitors. 
Alas, such positive outcome of the sabotaging instincts of business was not inherent to the 
economic system, nor were they proportionally as important as mainstream economists 
believed.  
 Neither Veblen nor John Commons appear to have made a distinction between 
industrial or commercial businesses, and financial entities. They considered J.P. Morgan or 
the Rockefellers ‘captains of industry’ as much as Jay Gould, ‘commodore’ Vanderbilt or 
Andrew Carnegie. We would interpret this to mean that the concept of sabotage, or the 
deliberate action that is aimed at weakening and disorienting another entity for own gain, be 
they the consumer, the competitor or the government, through subversion, obstruction, 
disruption or destruction, is also applicable in the financial sphere. Taking advantage of 
others – be they states, governments, shareholders, competitors or your own clients -  has 
become essence of  financial innovation and an ethos of many financial institutions today.  As 
a sociologist of finance observed recently, “financial innovation is, at heart, the subversion of 
existing routines, rules, and boundaries...Profit-making need not be its only goal; it  includes 
non-pecuniary motivations and objectives (Polillo 2011, 364). Only that Veblen would argue 
that such practices were very well established already a century ago.  
 
The Concept of Financial Sabotage 
We identify three key dimensions of the sabotaging instincts of financial businesses. First, 
with regards to their clients, second, the government, and third, sabotaging each other. Gary 
Dymski writes: ‘ownership rights in productive assets are embodied in long-lived, alienable 
nominal contracts or claims. So any individual’s wealth is more properly measured by the 
market value of her net assets than by the value of the “real assets” to which those paper 
assets correspond’ (Dymski 1991, 2).  This is an important distinction. Economists fully 
understand that economic actors are interested in the ‘bottom line’ – this is the theory of 
profit maximization. There is, however, a debate between standard economics and OIE as to 
which bottom line is of interest to businesses, and equally important, how businesses go 
about achieving their goals.  
Veblenian approach would suggest that financial businesses understand that their 
clients are interested primarily in the transitory market value of assets (in that sense, they are 
concerned with short-term calculations). As a result, they are likely to respond to their 
client’s ‘demand’ in a variety of ways, not least by inflating transitory asset values, worrying 
less about the long-term impact of such transitory techniques. As a result, competition in the 
financial markets does not necessarily produce long-term efficiencies in the provision of 
services. Rather, competition typically concentrates minds on various bench-marking 
comparative statistics.  Financial businesses aim to demonstrate, in any way they can, 
including fraudulent and manipulative use of statistics, accounts and numbers, that they are 
able to produce above-average appreciation of market value assets compared with their 
competitors.  
Sabotaging the clients  
How then, do financial businesses go about establishing their above average rate of asset 
value growth? There are mind-boggling numbers of techniques devised throughout the ages. 
The standard assumption is that whatever techniques are used, bench-markings pick up those 
financial actors that are successful because they are really good at what they do. Those who 
understand better the market, those who are better informed,  are more clever and more 
efficient, or possess the best software, staff and intricate knowledge of the financial system, 
are those that are likely to be successful and ‘beat the average’ rate of return on financial 
assets. Being the best (and often the first) to recognize and establish a trend, is what 
distinguishes a dynamic institution like  Goldman Sachs  from, a more conservative  and less 
dynamic entity like, say, Standard and Chartered. Or so has been the general belief before 
2007.  
Yet there are other techniques for inflating value, and they are legal, even if not, as 
Veblen notes, in spirit of the law. One simple but widespread technique is to use what 
economists call ‘asymmetric information’ – that is, the fact that clients are likely to be less 
knowledgeable than their banks -- and leverage.  Both work best by playing with other 
people’s money (OPM) – which is the expertise of the financial actors. The idea is very 
simple: slight growth in financial assets could be magnified many times over depending on 
the leverage that one can obtain. Most individual consumers’ ‘habit of thought’ is stuck at a 
1:1 leverage ratio, i.e., their salary or personal profit is gauged in a 1:1 ratio. The consumers 
of financial services are therefore habituated to think in terms of 1:1 of investment ratio.  
Some consumers had learned that in good times they seem to be making good money 
in the real estate sector for a number of related reasons, but which essentially have to do with 
leverage. If a person takes a 75% mortgage (ideally, to be paid back interest only) then they 
achieve 1:4 leverage. In other words, on every dollar they put in, they achieve 4 dollars of 
appreciation (if there is one). For a while, appreciation is assured  for no other reasons than 
as more people learn about the ‘profits’ made in real-estate, they ‘invest’ more and more in 
the market. Some wanted to be ‘on the ladder’, and many began to speculate on real estate. 
The effect was akin to what Jan Toporowski (Toporowski 1999) calls capital market 
inflation, or net inflow of capital chasing limited opportunities. The result of individual 
consumers factoring in their calculations of rising value was a self-fulfilling mechanism, as 
property rises appeared to be heading in one direction.  
 In their roles as Veblenian businessmen, financiers realized there were enormous 
short-term profits to be made by feeding the habits of their consumers.  But feeding the habit 
proved risky o two counts. First, when real estate markets are rising in value, a declining 
portion of clients are able to put down the customary 25% down payment. The theory is that 
this would slow down demand for housing would lead then to the wonderful forces of 
equilibrium in action. The preferred solution to market signals was not to follow the market 
return to equilibrium, but instead to reduce the percentage of necessary down payment from 
25% to 10%, then to 5% and eventually to 0% and even less, on the grounds that as property 
prices rise, the percentage of real ‘down payment’ would rise with it. Clients were now able 
to increase their leverage from 1:4 to 1:10 or even more, and made as a result, what appeared 
to be fabulous profits. 
 Second, financial businesses understood that their own resources were too limited to 
feed the frenzy. Regulated banks were constrained in their activities by the requirements of 
banking regulation such as Basle 2. Under the rules, if they wanted to engage in new 
activities such as the subprime mortgage market and thus take on more risk, they needed 
more regulatory capital to account for these risks. The Holy Grail of financial innovation 
came in 1994-95, when a technique that would later become known as collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) was invented. The instrument allowed banks (JP Morgan initially) to 
insure and move off the books (sell to a third party, AIG in this case), the risk of default of a 
corporate clients.  Soon enough the technique started to be applied to the mortgage products 
and specifically, to subprime mortgages and eventually other types of unsecured. The 
practice, now centered on several types of risk trade, reliance on wholesale market funding 
(or shadow banks) for loans, allowed more risk-prone financial institutions to sabotage their 
more conservative competitors. On the surface, the practice appeared as the perfect example 
of innovation in the financial market producing efficiencies in intermediation between savers 
and borrowers. The reality was different: the expanding bubble economy and the shadow 
banking system were bound to implode at some point. 
Was it an act of financial sabotage? Was it a deliberate action aimed at profit making 
through subversion, obstruction, disruption or destruction? It is possible to argue, as many 
economists do, that the concept of mortgage-backed security (MBS) or asset-backed security 
(ABS)  is a good one, as it ensures continuing liquidity in the housing market.  A CDO is a 
brilliant invention as it allows banks to free up capital to employ it more productively. But at 
the same time, a good rational actor of standard financial economics should have been very 
careful in dabbling in securitization and re-securitization during ‘good times’. The key 
function of banking institutions, after all, is to ensure the smooth and efficient intermediation 
between savers and borrowers. They were playing with other people’s money and should 
have been prudent in doing so. But these types of rational actors, were swamped by the 
bullish ones, and subsequently suffered losses.   
We believe, therefore, that the behavior that is commonly associated with human 
failure in finance (greed, exuberance, fraud), became widespread practice  and can be best 
described as sabotage in Veblenian terms. It amounted to technique of sabotaging clients, 
although, as Veblen acknowledged, it is not easy to prove the case in court of law. During the 
Savings-and-Loan crisis of the 1980s, a thousand prosecutions were launched against 
financial companies and hundreds of financial executives were convicted of crimes. In the 
wake of the dot-com collapse, more than a thousand were. During the latest crisis, the US 
authorities have largely been unable to convince juries that the desperate efforts of executives 
to persuade investors that things were under control in the depths of the crisis amounted to 
wrongdoing (Zaring 2013). 
 Shifting the products of securitization and re-securitization was clearly the Achilles 
heel in this process. Financial institutions had to sabotage, therefore, not only their clients, 
but also their competitors and other financial institutions so they will purchase these very 
doubtful products.  A former executive of Goldman Sachs has summarized three quick ways 
to become a leader in the firm:  
a) Execute on the firm’s “axes,” which is Goldman-speak for persuading your clients 
to invest in the stocks or other products that we are trying to get rid of because they are not 
seen as having a lot of potential profit. 
 b) “Hunt Elephants.” In plain English: get your clients — some of whom are 
sophisticated, and some of who aren’t — to trade whatever will bring the biggest profit to 
Goldman.   
 c) Find yourself sitting in a seat where your job is to trade any illiquid, opaque 
product with a three-letter acronym (Smith 2012).  
Such behavior is seen nowadays as some form of distortion and perversion of what 
finance should be about. The behavior is often described as ‘rogue’ or exceptional behavior 
within these institutions, blinded by a poorly-designed bonus culture, whereas the highly 
remunerated senior partners in such institutions, many of whom dabble in politics as well, 
profess to have known nothing, indeed, are personally indignant and upset, as they learn 
about these practices. The Veblenian theory of sabotage suggests that far from being evidence 
of some rogue behavior, these practices are exactly how business are likely to behave unless 
they are placed under close scrutiny.   
Financial innovation plays an important role here, in two respects. First, the technique 
of sabotage works best undetected. Innovation, both structural and product innovation, has 
generated opacity, ostensibly warranted by the complexity of risk management tasks and 
money values involved. As Biais et al (2009) note, “hedge funds shroud themselves in 
mystery as to strategies, holdings, turnover, costs, and leverage. It is hard to monitor the 
diligence and competence of their managers in the absence of information on the sources of 
performance. The growth of structured finance and CDS's has meant greater reliance on over-
the-counter trades that circumvent the discipline of open markets and regulation.” Kurt Kew 
(2007) has observed that in cases where ‘propensity to innovate’ is a stable characteristic of 
institutional culture rather than a random result occurring within many equally creative 
institutions, “opacity might become a critical property of innovative financial institutions”  
(Kew 2007, 6).  
Opacity and complexity can be interpreted from a Veblenian perspective as sabotage 
that was aimed to ensure that clients, the regulators, and even the management of the firm 
itself, had difficulties grasping what was really traded or created. Other papers in this Issue 
discuss the unique asymmetric information advantages of banks, s0 we take this advantage as 
a given and argue here that it is used in sabotage.  At the aggregate level, the complexity that 
is inherent in the financial system that thrives on financial innovation is also a powerful agent 
by itself. Citing the French philosopher Pierre Bourdieu in her own account of the 2007-09 
financial crisis, Gillian Tett notes that in a range of tools employed by elites to exercise 
control over society, the so-called areas of social silence are no less important than say, 
ownership of the means of production or financial resources. Power in a given socio-political 
context in other words, is not defined simply by the control over financial, intellectual or 
physical capital of a society, but also by the way a society talks about itself and understands 
its behavior. As Tett argues, ‘what matters is not merely what is publicly discussed, but also 
what is not mentioned in public’ (2009: xiii, italics in the original). Tett continues her own 
story about a credit derivative – which many believe, is the actual instrument that brought 
down the world financial system in 2007-09 – explaining that an important area of social 
silence, both inside and outside the banking world, developed about credit derivatives during 
the boom years of 2000-07. Such silence was partly a reflection of the opacity necessarily 
built into the process and products of financial  innovation, but such silence was also 
accepted, publicly and politically, because of the presence of so-called silos – ‘self-contained 
realms of activity and knowledge that only the experts in that silo can truly understand’ (Tett 
2009: xiv).   
 Second, financial innovation has been tightly intertwined with legal mechanisms. The 
principles of ownership, analyzed by Veblen and Common a century ago, have become 
absolutely central in era of ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking. Only this time 
around, it is the principle of non-ownership that finance seems to thrive on. Financial 
businesses have tended to set up entities called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). These 
vehicles were supposed to be separate and independent of the issuing entity for bankruptcy 
purposes. Clients would therefore be less concerned with the doubtful situation of the selling 
entity (a bank originating the mortgages), and focus only on the products (bonds issued by the 
legally orphaned SPV) – which the rating agencies believed were safe. Post-crisis reality 
proved somewhat different as courts were not prepared to accept the fiction of separation for 
bankruptcy purposes.  The validity of the claims for separation by SPVs was not challenged 
in court of law before the crisis. Was it known that SPVs are dangerous, possibly toxic? Yet 
it was. Experts knew and wrote about it – but somehow the message did not get through. We 
argue here it was due to effective sabotage.  
 
Sabotaging Governments 
Another important sabotaging technique goes under the title, ‘structured finance’. Nigel 
Lawson, former UK Chancellor of the exchequer under Thatcher and member of the House 
of Lords selected to sit on a parliamentary investigation into the Libor-rigging scandal said on 
the leading BBC program, Newsnight, in 30/01/13 that ‘structured financial vehicles in a 
euphemism for tax avoidance’. Lawson has a point. A good number of SPEs were registered 
offshore, presumably to obtain what a BIS study described as ‘tax neutrality’ – or tax 
avoidance in layman’s terms (BIS 2009). Everyone loves the idea: those who gain from the 
facility of tax neutrality (i.e. avoidance, or sabotaging your own government) clearly did. 
Those who bought the products assumed they were getting cheaper deals as the sellers were 
not burdened by taxation.  Those who provided the facility happily charged for the service.  
Let us consider the nature of a not atypical Cayman registered set of SPEs that were run 
by Bear Stearns. SPEs are highly obscure financial entities, and not much is known about 
them. The reason we know so much about these SPEs is due to the bankruptcy proceeding 
that Bear Stearns entered into. Bear Stearns maintained two High-Grade open ended 
investment companies that invested in asset-backed securities (“ABSs”), mortgage-backed 
securities, derivatives, options, swaps, futures, equities, and currencies. Funds that were 
registered as Cayman Islands exempted limited liability companies. The funds were 
administered by PFPC Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, which administered the funds and 
performed all back office functions, including accounting and clerical operations. The books 
and records of these funds were maintained and stored in Delaware, a state known as internal 
tax havens in the U.S. (Sharman 2011).  Deloitte & Touche, Cayman Islands, performed the 
most recent audit of these funds. The investment manager of this fundwas Bear Stearns Asset 
Management Inc., a New York corporation (“BSAM”) .The investor registers were held in 
Dublin, Ireland (another well-known tax haven) by an affiliate of PFPC Inc... Two of the 
three investors in one of the Funds were registered in the Cayman Islands as well, but they 
were both Bear Stearns entities, which appear to have the same minimal Cayman Islands 
profile as did the two Funds. Accounts receivable were located across Europe and theU.S.; 
counterparties to master repurchase and swap agreements were based both inside and outside 
the U.S., but none were in the Cayman Islands.  
The courts concluded that the link between Cayman Islands that two SPVs was 
tenuous. The funds were registered in the Caymans, and had two (‘dummy’) directors that 
were residents of Cayman – but that was about it. Bearn Stearns went into the trouble of 
setting up very complex structures, spanning many jurisdictions, paying hefty fees for 
lawyers, accountant, clerks, all sort of license fees and the Cayman Islands dummy directors 
whose job was to do absolutely nothing. What exactly was the purpose of such complex 
structures like the one maintained by Bearn Stearns in the Caymans? The concept of ‘dummy 
director’ is very popular (McCabe 2012). McCabe’s analysis of 3,232 companies with 
address at the Irish Financial Services Sector (IFSC) named individuals, each sitting on the 
boards of hundreds of companies, a lucrative business for these individuals. The Irish 
stockbroker firm A&L Goodbody, is company secretary for 1,088 companies! Including 
aircraft leasing, banks, investment funds, asset management, real estate and energy, where 
Matsack Trust limited is a company secretary for 1,295 companies, and so on. Clearly 
Goodbody and Matsack cannot possibly execute their task as company secretary in any 
meaningful way for any of those companies. Similar finding for large scale brass plate 
companies are found in the Netherlands and in Cayman.  
Why then, to set up these complex and expensive structures that do not appear on the 
surface to be the most efficient way of allocating scarce resources? There were a number of 
reasons for doing so. First and foremost, offshore SPEs facilitate tax neutrality, or tax 
optimization. In Veblenian language, that amounts to sabotaging your government. The idea 
of tax minimization is so widespread and built in into our psyche that it is not seen as 
problem. The problem arises, however, when the financial system implodes, as it did in 2008, 
requiring  the state to bail it out. But it is the same financial system that already weakened the 
state to the point that bailing out the financial system has led to very large sovereign debt 
crisis which ultimately damages the ability of the state to sustain the economy which finance 
feeds upon. 
Our own research into the uses of offshore SPVs revealed other sabotaging purpose. 
Another now widely known bankruptcy case, the one of the British bank, Northern Rock, a 
Jersey-based SPV called Granite was used by the bank to affect a sham process called ‘true 
sale.’ True sale means somewhat different things in different jurisdictions, but essentially it 
refers to exchange between two entities that do not share common ownership. The idea is that 
when two separate entities trade assets they will do so for good economic reasons, hence, the 
trade may be considered as ‘true sale’ as opposed to the very common intra-company trade 
that take place world-wide. Rating agencies were prepared to rate only the products that were 
sold in the markets under ‘true sale’ arrangements. The beauty of offshore SPEs was that that 
no one was able to know for sure who were the ultimate owners and beneficiariesof assets or 
the SPE, as was the case of Northern Rock (and we have learned subsequently, many other 
banks). Hence, financial houses could ‘sell’ a product effectively to themselves or to the 
entities they controlled offshore at any price they wish to cite, and the apparent ‘true sale’ 
would serve  as pointer for other trades that would then follow the original true sale. Was it 
an act of rogue behavior of some marginal financial actors, or was it a typical act of 
Veblenian sabotage? Complexity was introduced, as in many other instances in finance, in 
order to fool gullible investors. Yes, but incredibly, as Veblen notes, not illegal, if not in the 
spirit of the law.  
 
Too big to jail, but too good not to sabotage. 
Andy Haldane of the Bank of England calculates that the ‘natural’ size of large bank, that is 
the natural size of the efficient standard economics banking entity, is about $US 100 billion 
of assets (Haldane 2012). Yet, many banks evolved somehow into much larger entities, some 
of them had over US$ 1 trillion of assets. Why is that? Veblenians point out that size had 
become a prime technique of sabotaging both the state as well as the competitors. In the 
leverage game, banks learned that size does matter. For three related reasons. First, the 
market factored in their ‘too big to fail’, which meant, they could now garner lower rates of 
interest in the ‘open markets’ because the markets factored in sovereign support to them. 
Haldane calculates that the combine advantage of being too big to fail gave these institutions 
discounted interests rates that would account collectively to about $US 70 billion annually 
before the crisis. That is, their large size gave them an advantage compared to lower size 
banking institutions (Brewer III and Jagtiani 2007; Hughes and Mester 1993).  
Second, and more directly, size combined with leverage has increased their economic 
leverage and apparent profit (Mester 2005; Mishkin 2006). The profits were sustainable 
however, only for as long as the boom continued. When the music stopped playing, the 
complex interconnections and the size of leverage created during the boom years, have pulled 
down large banking houses and the banking system as a whole. The link between apparent 
performance during good times and impact of potential losses during a crisis is the third 
opportune technique of sabotaging by size.  
Third, size, or systemic significance widely understood, appears to give immunity to 
financial institutions. Our banks have become not only too big to fail, but also too big to jail 
(Alessandri and Haldane 2009; Mishkin 2006; Pennacchi 2000). Eric H. Holder, Jr., US 
attorney general, has noted the failure to persecute multinational banks for various 
transgressions during the recent boom: “I am concerned that the size of some of these 
institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we 
are hit with indications that if we do prosecute – if we do bring a criminal charge – it will 
have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy” (Henning 
2013).  
Analyzing the possible lessons of such a crisis, Veblen warned that: “the abruptness 
of the recapitalization and of the redistribution of ownership involved in a period of 
liquidation may be greatly mitigated, and the incidence of the shrinkage of values may be 
more equally distributed, by a judicious leniency on the part of the creditors or by a well-
advised and discreetly weighted extension of credit by the movement to certain sections of 
the business community” [Veblen 1904, 205]. It appears that the age of the financial 
innovation has stretched the Veblenian notion of such mitigation to extreme.  Table 1 below 
presents an analysis of the so-called ‘Heads I Win, Rails Your Lose’  bank  bonus culture and 
specifies in detail the size of bonus  packages paid out by  the banks who were the recipients  
of TARP  scheme in  2008. The summary of the investigation contused by New York State 
Attorney at the time is simple enough: “When banks did well, their employees were paid 
well. When banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when banks did very 
poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their employees were still paid well. Bonuses 
and overall compensation did not vary significantly as profits diminished” (Cuomo 2009: 1).  
Insert table 1 about here.  
 
Conclusion 
It is generally accepted that simple, parsimonious theories are more preferable to complex 
paradigms because they offer a better handle for analysis and regulation. In finance, the 
simplicity is offered by the efficient market theory; an elegant vision that combines actors, 
incentives, and dynamics of inter-relationships among them. We argue in this paper that 
Thorstein Veblen offers an alternative simple, parsimonious theory that provides an equally 
good analytical tool to cut through the maze of complexity and apparent randomness in the 
financial system driven by financial innovation, namely, though his conceptualization of 
sabotage   as business tactics.  
 Veblen suggests that instead of using the standard economics production function and 
apply it nilly-willy to finance, it is better to think of financial houses as businesses, and as 
businesses that operates primarily by sabotaging their customers, their government and their 
competitors. Theories of financial regulation, in turn, would work the ideas as a central 
premise as well, seeking to regulate and anticipate the behavior of sabotaging entities in a 
complex system of finance.  
 
Table 1. 
TARP recipients 2008 Bonus chart  
Legend: each bank’s earnings/loses; bonus pool, number of employees, earning per 
employee, bonus per employee, amount of TARP funds received and the amount of bonus 
payments in excess of $3 million,. $2 million, and $1 million  
Source: Guomo, A. 2009.  
 Earnings/ 
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M 
>$2
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$4,000,000,
000 
$3,300,00
0,000 
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0 
$16,46
1 
$13,580 $45
bn 
28 65 172 
Bank 
of New 
York 
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$1,400,000,
000 
$945,000,
000 
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0,000) 
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0,000 
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12
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Sachs 
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000 
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30,067 $77,22
8 
$160,420 $10
bn 
21
2 
391 953 
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